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THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR 
RESTRAINT SINCE THE 
PENTAGON PAPERS• 
James L. Oakest 
"The generalization that prior restraint is particularly 
obnoxious in civil cases must yield to more particularistic 
analysis." Paul Freund.•• 
I am extremely honored to have been asked to deliver the first 
Kenneth Murray Lecture. The late Mr. Murray, I understand, 
was a distinguished Detroit attorney who represented the De-
troit Free Press and other media clients for forty years, and who 
lectured regularly here at the Department of Communication. I 
hope he would approve of what I have to say. 
The purpose of this speech is to examine how the doctrine 
against prior restraint has evolved since the Pentagon Papers 
case. I intend to demonstrate that while traditional antipathy to 
prior restraint has for the most part remained strong, several re-
cent cases foreshadow a dangerous expansion of well-established 
exceptions to the doctrine. To understand fully the significance 
of these recent cases, I will begin this lecture with a general dis-
cussion of the historical origins of the doctrine against prior re-
traint. I will then proceed with a critical overview of the 
landmark Pentagon Papers case, more formally called New York 
Times Co. v. United States. 1 The remainder of the discussion 
will focus on five Supreme Court cases decided since the Penta-
gon Papers decision - Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com-
mission on Human Relations,• Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad,3 Young v. American Mini Theatres," Nebraska Press 
• Delivered as the first KeMeth J. Munay Lecture at the Department of 
Communication, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 18, 1982. This 
lecture is reporduced without substantial change, except for the addition of 
footnotes.The reader is asked to bear in mind that this address was written for the ear, 
and not the eye. 
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
•• Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rsv. 533, 539 (1951). 
1. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiant). 
2. 413 U.S. 376 (1972). 
3. 420 U.S. 546 (1976). 
4. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
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Association v. Stuart, 11 and Snepp v. United States8 - as well 
as three recent lower court decisions involving national security 
considerations: United States v. Marchetti, 7 Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc. v. Colby,8 and United States v. The Progressive.8 
I. THE ORIGINS OF PRIOR RESTRAINT 
A prior restraint is an official restriction upon a communica-
tion before it is published. The restriction may be enacted by 
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the federal, state, 
or local government. Our modern doctrine against prior restraint 
derives from our English forebears' antipathy toward licensing 
procedures that required approval of publications in advance by 
state or church authorities. That antipathy found perhaps its 
highest expression in the poet Milton's Areopagitica, and its 
most quoted legal affirmation in Blackstone, who wrote: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature 
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous· re-
straints upon publications, and not in freedom from cen-
sure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman 
has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases 
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom 
of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mis-
chievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his 
own timerity [sic].10 
Traditional English antipathy to prior restraints was well in the 
minds of our Founding Fathers at the time of the adoption of 
the first amendment, for the colonists had lived with the contin-
ual fear of the Sedition Act of 1798;11 Peter Zenger's case11 was 
5. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
6. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
7. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
8. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
9. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed mem., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 
1979). 
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (Oxford 1765). 
11. The Sedition Act of 1798 was passed by a Federalist Congress to silence deroga-
tory criticism of public officials and strengthen the government's position in an impend-
ing war with France. When Jefferson became President in 1801, he denounced the Act as 
contrary to the first amendment and pardoned all persons who had been convicted or 
fined under the Act. See generally J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S F'BTrERS (1956). 
12. John Peter Zenger, the colonial printer and publisher of the New York Weekly 
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not readily forgotten. 
Yet it was not until 1931 that the Supreme Court invoked the 
doctrine against prior restraint. In the landmark case of Near v. 
Minnesota 13 the Court held that it was unconstitutional for 
Minnesota to enjoin the publication of newspapers deemed "ma-
licious, scandalous, and defamatory" solely because they consti-
tuted a nuisance.14 The Court did not say, however, that all 
prior restraints on speech and press were incompatible with the 
first amendment. Rather, Chief Justice Hughes's majority opin-
ion pointed out that in certain exceptional cases - obscenity, 
incitement to violence, and opposition to the conduct of war -
the government could enjoin speech or press. 15 He stressed that 
these exceptions were narrow, however, and that "immunity 
from previous restraints or censorship" had historically been the 
principal value of the first amendment. 18 
Since Near, the doctrine of prior restraint has promoted re-
sponsibility in government by ensuring that the Government 
does not suppress exposure of its errors, deceptions, or embar-
rassments. The doctrine has also worked to ensure that speech is 
not readily subjected to the biases of the censor.17 A system that 
imposes prior restraints chills public communication. As Justice 
Lewis Powell said in Pi,ttsburgh Press Co. v. Pi,ttsburgh Com-
mission on Human Relations,18 "[t]he special vice of a prior re-
straint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly 
or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an ade-
quate determination [has been made] that it is unprotected by 
the First Amendment."19 Of course, in this respect, subsequent 
punishment may be no better than prior restraint; it too can 
chill speech and cause self-censorship, as New York Times Co. v. 
Journal, was tried on August 4, 1735 for seditioua libel. Zenger· ultimately won a verdict 
of "not guilty," and the case was immediately hailed as a landmark victory for the free-
dom of the press. Today the Zenger case is invoked frequently to demonstrate the impor-
tance of guarding against judicial tyranny in libel suite. See generally THE TRIAL OP 
PETER ZENGER (V. Buranelli ed. 1957). 
13. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
14. Id. at 701-02, 723. 
15. Id. at 716. 
16. Id. 
17. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 152 (Oxford 1765): 
To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, 
both before and since the revolution, . . . is to subject all freedom of sentiment 
to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of 
all controverted points in learning, religion, and government. 
18. 413 U.S. at 376 (1972). 
19. Id. at 390. 
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Sullivanso and its progeny recognized when they set constitu-
tional limits on state libel laws. But as the late Alexander Bickel 
put it: "[a] criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes."u 
II. THE PENTAGON p APERS CASE 
The Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United 
States, H was the first case on which I sat after coming to the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals from district court. Along with 
Judges Irving Kaufman and Wilfred Feinberg, I voted in favor 
of the New York Times to uphold the late Judge Murray 
Gurfein's ruling that the United States should be denied an in-
junction against the publication of the Pentagon Papers. While 
our position was held by only a minority of the judges on the 
circuit, ss the Supreme Court ultimately sided with us. I will 
draw a little from my own recollections in discussing that case, 
as well as from a paper I wrote after Judge Gurfein's death 
about his participation in the case as his first decision on the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York." 
The Pentagon Papers case left the courts little time to debate 
where the outer limits of the doctrine of prior restraints lay. The 
Supreme Court was about to take the final adjournment of its 
term in June 1971, when the New York Times and the Washing,. 
ton Post published their stories. Daniel Ellsberg had revealed to 
the press the Government's own secret historical analysis of 
American involvement in the undeclared, and by then unpopu-
lar, war in Vietnam. After waiting more than two days from the 
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
21. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OJ' CONSENT 61 (1975). 
Professor Vincent Blasi of the University of Michigan Law School contends that in-
junctions against speech are analogous to the historically disfavored practice of licensing 
speech. Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. 
REv. 11, 93 (1981). He argues that both are based on the undemocratic premise that 
"speech is an abnormally dangerous social force" that needs to be regulated. Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931). He finds, as I do, that such a premise cannot be 
squared with our constitutional commitments to individual autonomy and limited gov-
ernment. Indeed, he and I would agree with Professor Freund that freedom of expression 
may be "the fundamental end, reflecting the nature of man." Freund, The Supreme 
Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 548 (1951). 
22. 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'g per curiam, 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd per 
curiam, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
23. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals voted five to three in favor of granting the 
injunction. Id. 
24. See Oakes, Judge Gurfein and the Pentagon Papers, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 5 (1980). 
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time the first editions of the Times hit the streets/111 the United 
States sought to enjoin further publication. The Government 
also sought an injunction in federal court in the District of Co-
lumbia to prevent the Washington Post from publishing the Pa-
pers. In both cases the Government argued that publication 
would violate the espionage statutes, reveal top-secret informa-
tion, 0 and cause irreparable injury to United States security 
interests.18 
With each passing day of judicial consideration the signifi-
cance and impact of the temporary restraining order that halted 
publication of the Papers increased. Within the week, though, 
Judge Gurfein had come down for the Times. Yet, given the Su-
preme Court's pending adjournment, our court could take only 
seventy-two hours to consider the case on appeal. On first 
glance, it appeared we would have insufficient time to evaluate a 
record which included forty-seven volumes totaling 7,000 pages. 
Nevertheless, contrary to Justice Blackmun's later statement 
that the judges in New York "had not yet examined the basic 
material" when the case reached the Supreme Court,17 we did 
have the opportunity, even in that brief time, to examine the 
documents and the testimony that the Government thought 
most important. 
The Government sought to justify the prior restraint by fitting 
it within what it conceded was a narrow military security excep-
tion suggested by Justice Hughes in Near: "[when a nation is at 
war], no one would question but that a government might pre-
vent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publica-
tion of the sailing dates of transports or the number and loca-
tion of troops."18 The Government also argued that because the 
documents were "stolen," they were subject to special inhibitory 
treatment; thus the courts could restrain publication both under 
the espionage statutes and by virtue of their inherent powers. 
The Government further contended that the executive branch 
had properly classified the documents top secret, that only the 
25. The Government took no judicial action from the release of the first Sunday edi-
tion late Saturday night, June 12, until the third publication for Tuesday, June 15, had 
gone to press on Tuesday, June 15. Perhaps the Government it.self debated whether the 
documents were important enough in light of press freedoms to justify seeking a re-
straining order. But see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 760 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). 
26. This marked the first time that the executive branch had ever sought to impose a 
prior restraint on - or even suggest application of the espionage statutes to - a major 
newspaper. 
27. 403 U.S. at 760 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
28. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
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executive, not the court, could declassify the documents,19 and 
that the executive would need forty-five days to carry out the 
declassification. 
This last argument was considerably weakened by the Govern-
ment'.s concession that there had been over-classification of 
some material that was no longer "top secret." The Government 
also acknowledged that the Court was not bound by the classifi-
cation, even though it also said that there was a substantial ex-
ecutive privilege pertaining to military and foreign affairs 
documents. 
I approached the case with a few basic principles in mind: (1) 
that even in contexts other than prior restraint, the exercise of 
first amendment rights may generally be limited only where 
there is a "clear and present danger"80 or a "grav[e] ... evil"81 
to be avoided; (2) that it is a "chief purpose of the guaranty [of 
freedom of the press] to prevent previous restraints on publica-
tion" by either the legislative or the executive branches;H (3) 
that if the press is to fulfill its function of checking the govem-
ment88 by ensuring freedom of political discussion" it must be 
free from "such previous restraints upon publications as had 
been practiced by other governments, and in early times here, to 
stifle the efforts of patriots toward enlightening their fell ow sub-
jects upon their rights and the duties of rulers";85 (4) that any 
prior restraint comes to court "bearing a heavy presumption 
against its constitutional validity"88 so that the Government 
"carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposi-
tion of such a restraint";87 and (5) that even the war powers ex-
ercised by the commander-in-chief, however broad they may be, 
are subject to "applicable constitutional limitations."88 
29. The Government argued that under the existing case law, the court's function in 
reviewing government classification was limited to determining whether it was arbitrary 
or capricious. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Epstein v. Resor, 421 
F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970). 
30. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
31. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). 
32. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931). 
33. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR. FDT. 
REsEARCH J. 521, 580-83 (1977). 
34. See Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Acts: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 655, 695 (1979) ("[A] representative government is functionally depen-
dent upon freedom of political discUBBion". Id. at 695). 
35. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313 (1825) (quoted in Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931)). 
36. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1968). 
37. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). 
38. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (quoting Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919)). See 
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It seemed to me, in light of these principles, that Judge 
Gurfein had refused quite correctly to enjoin the New York 
Times's publication of the Pentagon Papers. Judge Gurfein, 
himself a former OSS officer, concluded that while he could re-
strain a newspaper if it were "about to publish information or 
documents absolutely vital to current national security,"•• the 
Government - despite the in camera testimony of representa-
tives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff - had not shown "that the publi-
cation of these historical documents would seriously breach the 
national security."•0 
I admit I had some doubts about one cable proposed for publi-
cation, and about certain material relating to our involvement in 
Thailand. I also recognized that the documents might have a se-
rious impact on foreign policy decisions; indeed, while we heard 
argument, the Senate voted to require withdrawal of our armed 
forces from Vietnam within nine months after release of the · 
prisoners of war.•1 
Nevertheless, the Government failed to demonstrate that pub-
lication would vitally endanger the nation's security. The docu-
ments did not discuss matters after 1968. Thus any danger they 
might have posed to national security had been lessened by the 
passage of more than two years. Classification of the documents 
did not automatically mean they were related to national de-
fense.•• If anything, the Government's indiscriminate over-clas-
sification of documents41 cast serious doubt on just how vital the 
material was to our military interests. Of the 7,000 pages in-
volved, most of it was truly water over the dam. The Govern-
ment maintained that publication would result in irreparable 
damage to diplomatic relations with Saigon, Sweden, Australia, 
and other countries. Moreover, the Government feared that pub-
lication would disclose our military command apparatus or "de-
cision-making processes," and therefore rupture the worldwide 
also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1957). 
39. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. at 330. 
40. Id. See Oakes, supra note 24, at 12-13. 
41. S.J. Res. 89, 92d Cong., let Seas. (1971). 
42. See United States v. Drummond, 353 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 
U.S. 1013 (1966). 
43. This over-classification was contrary to Executive Order 10501, 3 C.F.R. § 7 at 
288-89, which requires that "proper control of dissemination of classified defense infor-
mation shall be maintained at all times, including . . . severe limitation in the number of 
such documents originated .... " The present administration bas proposed a relaxation 
of the standards for classification so that it will be easier to classify documents as "se-
cret." N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 3. 
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military balance. 44 It was, of course, difficult to determine 
whether these dire predictions would prove correct. Yet, in my 
view, Judge Gurfein was right to conclude that the Government 
had not shown with reasonable certainty that publication posed 
grave and immediate danger to our conduct of the undeclared 
war. 
Conversely, permitting publication of the Pentagon Papers 
furthered the democratic ideal of free and open debate on issues 
of public concern. The subject of the debate in this case was of 
particular importance, for it concerned the origins of our in-
volvement in a war that nearly everyone - including, perhaps, 
even the President - wanted ended. At stake, in short, were the 
very first amendment protections that made it possible for the 
press to alert the public to the "duties of rulers."·H By allowing 
publication the courts safeguarded these protections without 
necessarily condoning the way the newspapers obtained their 
material and without passing on the potential for post-publica-
tion criminal sanctions under the espionage laws;'8 
The ultimate result of the Pentagon Papers case, a six to three 
victory for the Times and the Post in the Supreme Court,47 was 
properly hailed by the press and much of the legal world. 
Clearly, publication of the Papers played an important role in 
enlightening the public and bringing the Vietnam conflict to an 
end some four years later. Perhaps, as Floyd Abrams has indi-
cated, it "may also have paved the way for the public's reaction 
to the Watergate transgressions" and "had direct, if utterly un-
predictable, effects on the Nixon White House. "48 Doubtless it 
has also led to a change in the relationship between press and 
government - a change which, while largely for the good, may 
also have resulted in greater hostility on the part of the press 
and greater secrecy on the part of the Government. 
It should be remembered, however, that the haste with which 
the case was reviewed and the deep concern for national security 
prompted three dissents in the Supreme Court. Yet those jus-
tices who voted with the majority also recognized the impor-
44. 328 F. Supp. at 327. 
45. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. at 313 (quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697, 717 (1931)). 
46. The Government had contended that the anti-espionage statutes, in particular 18 
U.S.C. § 793(e) (Supp. IV 1980), gave the courts power to enjoin publication. Because 
this statute punishes espionage as a crime, it is difficult to see how injunctive powers 
could have been implied from it. 
47. 403 U.S. at 714. 
48. See Abrams, The Pentagon Papers, A Decade Later, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1981, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 76. 
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ta.nee of national security. As Justice Brennan pointed out, the 
issue at bar was not whether national security could ever justify 
a prior restraint, but whether in this case the Government had 
proved that publication would "inevitably, directly and immedi-
ately cause the occurrence of aJi event kindred to imperilling the 
safety of a transport already at sea. "49 Similarly, Justices Stew-
art and White observed that the Government had failed to prove 
that the disclosures would, in this particular instance, "surely 
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Na-
tion or its people. "60 These three swing votes, therefore, leave 
open the question of whether the Court would permit a prior 
restraint if indeed it was clear that publication would result in 
"direct, immediate, and irreparable damage"61 to national secur-
ity. Thus, while the Pentagon Papers case upheld the doctrine 
against prior restraint, it also preserved the national security ex-
ception. It remains the key first amendment case of the decade. 
One of the witnesses who originally appeared for the Govern-
ment before Judge Gurfein has provided an interesting epilogue. 
William B. Macomber, Undersecretary of State for Administra-
tion, cited the embarrassment of the Prime Minister of Australia 
over revelations in the Papers concerning Australian troops sent 
to fight in Vietnam: "I just don't see how we can conduct diplo-
macy with this kind of business going on." Today Mr. Ma-
comber has another career as president of the Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art in New York, though I suspect this new career also 
involves diplomacy. Recently, Mr. Macomber admitted that the 
case was decided properly: 
I think that, even though I have been a diplomat all my 
life and nothing is more important to me than the secur-
ity of the United States, the First Amendment is, in an-
other way, the security of the United States. You can't 
save something and take the heart out of it. 61 
I must say I agree. 
49. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 726-27 (1931) (Brennan, J., concuning). 
50. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concuning). 
51. Id. 
52. Abrams, supra note 48, at 72. See also Lewis, Freedom of the Press, N.Y. Times, 
June 7, 1981, at E21, col. 1. 
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Ill. PRESERVING THE DOCTRINE AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINT: 
Pittsburgh Press, Southeastern Promotions, American Mini 
Theatres, AND Nebraska Press 
Since the Pentagon Papers decision the Court has addressed 
the issue of prior restraint in other co:ptexts. · Four cases merit 
special attention; in two the Supreme Court struck down prior 
restraints, and in two the Court upheld speech restrictions. De-
spite the mixed outcome, I think that in all of these decisions 
"the barriers to prior restraint remain[ed] high and· the pre-
sumption against its use continue[d] intact."118 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human 
Relations,M the first of the two cases in which the Court upheld 
speech restrictions, involved the constitutionality of a city ordi-
nance prohibiting the Pittsburgh Press from carrying help-
wanted advertising columns classified "Male," "Female," and 
"Male-Female." The Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions argued that the advertisements indicated and "aided" sex 
discrimination in employment. 1111 The Commission ordered the 
newspaper to classify its help-wanted advertisements without 
reference to sex. 66 The Pittsburgh Press, in turn, argued that the 
Commission's order violated the first amendment by restricting 
the paper's editorial judgment.117 
The Supreme Court rejected the Press's argument and upheld 
the order by a vote of five to four. The majorityM' viewed the 
placement of want ads in a newspaper as commercial speech, 119 
which at the time was considered unprotected under the first 
amendment.60 The Pittsburgh Press Court distinguished the 
Pentagon Papers case by noting that the latter involved "specu-
lat[ion] as to the effect of publication" whereas Pittsburgh Press 
53. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). 
54. 413 U.S. 376 (1972). 
55. Id. at 380. 
56. Id. at 379-80. 
57. Id. at 381. 
58. The majority consisted of the unusual combination of Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist. 
59. 413 U.S. at 388. 
60. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Virginia State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). But 
see Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Regardless of whether the speech was protected, the Court held that the order was not 
an unconstitutional prior restraint because it would not go into effect before the Su-
preme Court's final determination that the Pittsburgh Press's sex-designated advertising 
was unprotected by the first amendment. 413 U.S. at 390. 
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involved no speculation but rather "a continuing course of repet-
itive conduct. "81 While the distinction is technically correct, I 
think that the language used by the Court is dangerously broad, 
for the simple reason that it seems to invite restraint of, for ex-
ample, later articles in a series because the effects of earlier ones 
are no longer speculative.81 Yet, as will be seen,88 this "continu-
ing" language has not been read as broadly as it might be. Thus, 
I do not think that in the final analysis the Court significantly 
weakened the doctrine against prior restraint. Needless to say, 
the press's function of checking government was not at stake in 
Pittsburgh Press. 
The second of the two cases, Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres,84 upheld Detroit's "Anti-Skid-Row" zoning ordinances, 
which prohibited adult theatres from locating within 1,000 feet 
of two other adult establishments or within 500 feet of a residen-
tial area. "Adult" theatres were defined as those showing "speci-
fied sexual activities" or "specified anatomical areas."ea Justice 
Steven's opinion for a plurality of four Justices rejected the idea 
that these zoning ordinances, which merely regulated the "place 
where [adult] films may be exhibited,',ee could be prior re-
straints of expression. Instead, Justice Stevens concluded that 
this place regulation was reasonable despite its differing treat-
ment of "adult" and other kinds of content. 
In contrast, Justice Stewart's dissent argued that Detroit 
could not constitutionally prohibit speech on the basis of its 
adult content.87 Justice Stewart took issue with the plurality's 
contention that "few of us would march our sons and daughters 
off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual 
Activities' exhibited in the theatres of our choice.'• I agree with 
Justice Stewart on this point; the· plurality's willingness to ac-
cord lesser protection to speech that few of us would take up 
61. 413 U.S. at 390. 
62. As it turned out, the suppressed material in this instance remained unchanged 
throughout the course of "repetitive conduct." 
63. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
64. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
65. Id. at 53. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had found that the ordinances im-
posed a prior restraint on constitutionally protected communication. Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, 518 F.2d 1014, 1019-20 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
·66. 427 U.S. at 63. 
67. Id. at 84 (Stewart, J., dissenting): 
The Court today holds that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not pre-
vent the city of Detroit from using a system of prior restraints and criminal 
sanctions to enforce content-based restrictions on the geographic location of mo-
tion picture theaters that exhibit nonobscene but sexually oriented films. 
68. Id. at 70. But see id. at 73 n.l (Powell, J., concurring). 
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arms to defend is contrary to the values of individual autonomy 
and freedom of choice implicit in the first amendment. Protec-
tion of unpopular speech lies at the core of the Bill of Rights. 
Our Constitution values expression as an end in itself. Protec-
tion surely does not extend only to expression for which the na-
tion would go to war. 
Despite shortcomings in the majority's opinion, American 
Mini Theatres did not weaken the doctrine against prior re-
straint. As in Pittsburgh Press, the issue of prior restraint was 
never directly addressed. By classifying the disputed ordinance 
as a "time, place and manner restriction," the Court avoided a 
substantive discussion of the limits of the doctrine. 
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,69 the first of the two 
cases in which the Court struck down prior restraints, did little 
more than reiterate the well-established principle that in the 
area of marginal speech prior restraints are not acceptable un-
less a court can quickly determine whether or not the restrained 
speech is actually unprotected. In Southeastern, the Court held 
five to four that the board of the Chattanooga Municipal Thea-
ter could not bar presentation of the musical "Hair" without 
providing "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dan-
gers of a censorship system. "70 Insofar as the Chattanooga Board 
failed to provide an adequate procedure for prompt judicial re-
view, the Court held that its actions constituted an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint. 71 
69. 420 U.S. 546 (1976). 
70. Id. at 559 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)). 
71. While under Near the doctrine against prior restraint would not apply to obscene 
speech, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), the censors here had to prove ob-
scenity. For over a decade since Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the Court 
had held that the censor must bear the burden of proving that the material was unpro-
tected; a restraint could be imposed only temporarily while a judicial determination was 
being made. Id. at 58. See also Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 518, 522-24 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 648, 656-59 (1955). These procedural safeguards were applied even in cases 
involving arguably unprotected speech because, as the Court said in Southeastern 
Promotions: 
The presumption against prior restraints is heavier - and the degree of protec-
tion broader - than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal pen-
alties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law; a free society 
prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law 
than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in 
advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegiti-
mate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are 
formidable. 
420 U.S. at 558-59. Justice White and Chief Justice Burger dissented not out of disagree-
ment with this basic principle, but because they thought the district court's finding that 
"Hair" violated the Chattanooga obscenity laws was sufficient to conclude the material 
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Southeastern is interesting for what it did not do or say. 
Neither the majority nor the dissenters alluded to the Pitts-
burgh Press Court's broad "continuous course of repetitive con-
duct" language. Yet surely the musical "Hair," with a set script, 
libretto, production notes, and stage instructions, varied little 
from one performance to another, even though the performers 
had some discretion in the lines they delivered. Applying the 
Pittsburgh Press standard, the Board's action would not have 
constituted a prior restraint because there was no real specula-
tion about what each successive show would contain. The 
Court's failure to confront Pittsburgh Press may be an indica-
tion that the broad "repetitive conduct''. language will pose less 
of a threat to the doctrine against prior restraint than originally 
thought. 
Nebraska Press Association u. Stuart12 was the only one of 
the four cases discussed so far to involve a newspaper in its ca-
pacity as news-gatherer. In this widely hailed free press/fair trial 
case, the Court unanimously struck down a state court injunc-
tion prohibiting pretrial publication of confessions which clearly 
suggested that the defendant had murdered six members of a 
family. 73 Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger ob-
served that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the 
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on first 
amendment rights,"7' particularly when applied to the reporting 
of criminal proceedings, because "[t]he press does not simply 
publish information about trials but guards against the miscar-
riage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial 
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."711 More-
over, the opinion recognized that "the element of time is not un-
important if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of 
bringing news to the public promptly."78 As in the Pentagon Pa-
was unprotected speech. Id. at 565. 
72. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
73. Both the prosecution and defense counsel based their request for a protective 
order on a 1966 Supreme Court ruling that overturned the conviction of an Ohio hus-
band for the murder of his wife because of excessive publicity: 
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the 
courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court . . . . 
Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing 
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take 
strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358, 362 (1966). 
74. 427 U.S. at 559. 
75. Id. at 559-60 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)). 
76. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561. 
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pers case, the Court emphasized that even if pretrial publicity 
threatened the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial, 
the danger posed was only speculative. 
Nebraska Press did raise the question whether the presump-
tion against prior restraint might give way to a weaker test that 
would merely balance the intrinsic value of the speech against 
its potential for harm. The Chief Justice, however, surprisingly 
employed Learned Hand's Dennis test. In United States v. Den-
nis, 77 it will be recalled, the Second Circuit held that the Smith 
Act did not unconstitutionally abridge the freedom of speech by 
making it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the Government. 
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority, looked back to 
the "clear and present danger" test set forth by Justice Holmes 
in 1919 in Schenck v. United States. 78 Judge Hand reformulated 
that test in Dennis, writing that courts must consider whether 
"the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justi-
fies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger. "79 In Nebraska Press, the Chief Justice reasoned that even 
though no doubt existed about "the gravity of the evil pretrial 
publicity can work," there was no demonstration of its 
probability "with the degree of certainty our cases on prior re-
straint require."80 Thus, to the extent that the order prohibited 
publication of judicial proceedings held in public, it was clearly 
invalid; but where it prohibited publication based on informa-
tion from outside sources, the "heavy burden imposed as a con-
dition to securing. a prior restraint was not met . . . . "81 
Justice Brennan, joined by the concurring Justices Stewart 
and Marshall, concluded that trial gag orders were per se imper-
missible prior restraints. The Brennan opinion viewed the 
"heavy burden" language of earlier prior restraint cases to mean 
that the party seeking to impose the restraint must first show 
that its purpose fits within one of the narrowly defined excep-
tions set forth in Near: military security, obscenity, or incite-
ment to violence. 81 If restraint of alleged obscenity or incitement 
is sought, procedural safeguards should be required for a prompt 
judicial determination that the speech is not protected. Simi-
larly, if restraint of an alleged danger to military security is 
sought, it must be clear that disclosure "will surely result in di-
77. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd on opinion below, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
78. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
79. 183 F.2d at 212. 
80. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 568. 
81. Id. at 570. 
82. Id. (quoting Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1976)). 
SPRING 1982] Prior Restraint 511 
rect, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its 
people .... "83 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall recog-
nized that if the test for imposing prior restraints was based on 
a subjective assessment of the harm which would accrue to crim-
inal defendants; judges would "inevitably [be] interject[ed] ... 
at all levels into censorship roles that are simply inappropriate 
and impermissible under the First Amendment."8 ' 
While Nebraska Press was widely hailed as the most impor-
tant victory for freedom of the press since the Pentagon Papers, 
the difference between the Chief Justice's opinion and Justice 
Brennan's opinion is well worth noting. The most notable fea-
ture of the Burger opinion is that it does not state a general rule, 
but instead applies an ad hoc balancing test to decide first 
amendment cases, even in the prior restraint area. The use of 
the Hand test is problematic for several reasons. First, Dennis 
did not involve a prior restraint. n Second, the Hand standard is 
"notoriously amorphous. "86 As Benno Schmidt noted in a Stan-
ford Law Review symposium, the test has "not enjoyed good re-
pute as First Amendment doctrine, "87 and, as my mentor Paul 
Freund pointed out, the Hand test has been "subject to loose 
construction" and has "countenanc[ed] speculation in historical 
futures, the most dangerous form of gambling with the liberty of 
speech. "88 
Thus, it seems to me that this feature of the case is a lurking 
danger, despite the immediate outcome of the case in favor of 
the press. Like Professor Blasi, I take a "pathological" view 
when it comes to "tinkering" with first amendment freedoms; I 
worry about what some future court will do with the tinkering 
language. One's fears are to some extent allayed insofar as Ne-
braska Press was handed down in a frantic final week of one of 
the most crowded terms in the Court's history. Professor 
Schmidt has aptly noted that it was one of fifty-six cases de-
cided with full-dress opinions in the final month of a term of 
court that was almost "capsized" by the complicated case of 
83. Id. at 593 (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 
(1971) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
84. Id. at 594-95. 
85. In Dennis the issue was the punishment of the petitioner under the Smith Act 
after the alleged unprotected speech had been communicated to the public. 
86. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Con-
traction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 460 (1977). 
87. Id. at 460. 
88. Freund, The Great Disorder of Speech, 44 AM. SCHOLAR 541, 545 (1975), quoted 
in Schmidt, supra note 86, at 460 n.133. 
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Buckley v. Valeo.89 Clearly then, it remains an open question 
whether ad hoc balancing or a per se rule apply to the doctrine 
against prior restraint in fields such as free press and fair trial. 
As Alexander Bickel warned after the Pentagon Papers decision, 
we should beware lest the appearance of extending freedom "en-
danger[s] an assumed freedom, which appeared limitless because 
its limits were untried. "90 
IV. PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION 
A. Former Agents Marchetti and Snepp 
Turning back to national security as a ground for prior re-
straint, I will now examine several recent cases that, to a limited 
extent, pose a serious challenge to the doctrine against prior re-
straint. All involve attempts by the Central Intelligence Agency 
to impose pre-publication restrictions on its former employees. 
In United States v. Marchetti91 the CIA sought to enjoin its 
former agent, Victor Marchetti, from publishing a book based on 
his experiences in the Agency. Part of the material Marchetti 
used for his book was drawn from classified documents. A pre-
liminary injunction was issued by the lower court, and the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal.911 Each of the seven publish-
ers to whom Marchetti had submitted his uncensored manu-
script were ordered to halt publication. The court agreed with 
Marchetti that the first amendment and the doctrine against 
prior restraints "limits the extent to which the United States, 
contractually or otherwise, may impose secrecy requirements 
upon its employees and enforce them with a system of prior cen-
sorship. "98 Nonetheless, in this instance the court concluded 
that "we are . . . concerned with secret information touching 
upon the national defense and the conduct of foreign affairs 
• • • ."
114 The risk of harm from exposure "is so great and main-
tenance of the confidentiality of the information so necessary" 
that ordinary criminal sanctions might not suffice. 911 The court 
89. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Schmidt, supra note 86, at 475. 
90. Bickel, The Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open First Amendment, 54 COMMEN-
TARIES 60, 61 (1972), quoted in Schmidt, supra note 86, at 476 n.205. 
91. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
92. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). 
93. Id. at 1313. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1317. 
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reasoned further that secrecy agreements with employees pro-
vided a reasonable means for government agencies to protect in-
ternal secrets. The court limited its holding to the disclosure of 
classified information and required the CIA to act promptly to 
approve or disapprove any material submitted to it by Marchet-
ti. 98 The court declined, however, to review the system of classi-
fication of documents and information, finding it a matter of 
"the executive function [which was] beyond the scope of judicial 
review. "97 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby98 was Marchetti's case on re-
mand to the district court. The CIA initially claimed that 339 
items contained classified information; gradually the number 
was reduced to 168.99 The court of appeals in Knopf candidly 
admitted: "[w]hen writing ... Marchetti, we did not foresee the 
problems as they developed in the district court. We had not 
envisioned any problem of identifying classified information em-
bodied in a document produced from the files of such an agency 
as the CIA and marked 'Top Secret' or 'Confidential.' "100 The 
court remanded the case again, stating that for the Government 
to meet its burden of proof it need only show that the informa-
tion was "classifiable"101 - the meaning of which is unclear, at 
best. Meanwhile, Knopf published the book with the 168 dis-
puted items omitted. 
The Knopf decision is significant because the court did not 
apply the national security standard of "direct, immediate, and 
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people" that the Stew-
art, White, and Brennan opinions in the Pentagon Papers case109 
would have required. In the court's view, the secrecy agreements 
Marchetti signed with the CIA - requiring him to submit his 
96. Id. at 1318. 
97. Id. at 1317. Nevertheless, the court did give Marchetti the right to judicial review 
of any action disapproving publication. Id. 
98. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
99. · In the district court, four deputy directors of the CIA testified that the informa-
tion contained in 168 of the items was classified. This testimony, however, was too gen-
eral and undocumented to satisfy the district judge. Only after the United States offered 
what the court of appeals called "a batch of documents" did the district judge find that 
the information embodied in 26 of the 168 items sought to be deleted had actually been 
classified while Marchetti was an agent. 509 F.2d at 1365-66. 
100. Id. at 1367. The court was rather apologetic for having "perhaps misled" the dis-
trict judge into imposing an "unreasonable and improper burden of proof of classifica-
tion," id., when in fact "the government was required to show no more than that each 
deletion disclosed information which was required to be classified in any degree and 
which was contained in a document bearing a classification stamp." Id. at 1368. 
101. Id. at 1370. 
102. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) {per curiam) 
{White, J., concurring). 
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manuscript to the CIA for authorization and allowing the CIA to 
withhold authorization for classified information - "effectively 
relinquished his First Amendment rights,"103 and made the issue 
of national security irrelevant. 
This reliance on secrecy agreements is troubling for several 
reasons. First, under the agreement it is exceedingly easy for the 
CIA to establish that a disputed document is classified; if the 
Agency can produce a classified document containing references 
to the information in question, the dispute will be resolved in its 
· favor. Second, requirements found in secrecy agreements, such 
as loyalty oaths, are frequently overbroad. As a result, these 
agreements prohibit publication of information that in no way 
endangers government security interests. Third, secrecy agree-
ments can make a mockery of the reasonableness standards 
which are generally applied to government employment con-
tracts.10• Regardless of the facts of a particular case, it is a sim-
ple matter for any court to conclude, as the Fourth Circuit did 
here, that the contract was reasonable because "information 
highly sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs and the national 
defense was involved, "1011 even though no showing had been 
made that the specific danger was of sufficient gravity and immi-
nence to warrant prior restraint. 108 
In short, the application of first amendment law in Marchetti 
and Knopf is highly questionable; classification was accorded too 
great a presumption of regularity, and secrecy agreements were 
not held to a standard of reasonableness that required a showing 
of harm to national interests from disclosure. 
In a related case, Snepp v. United States, 107 CIA agent Frank 
Snepp, like Marchetti, signed secrecy agreements. Although the 
material in Snepp's book on CIA activity in Vietnam was not 
classified, the CIA brought an action against him for violating an 
agreement not to "publish or participate in the publication of 
any information or material relating to the Agency . . . without 
103. Knopf, 509 F.2d at 1370. 
104. See United States Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 74, 101 (1947). 
105. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1316. 
106. In conspiracy cases involving an alleged disclosure of secret documents, the stan-
dard has long been that the Government must show more than that a classified docu-
ment was simply disclosed; it must also show that disclosure resulted in damage to na-
tional security. See United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236, 239 n.2 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. 
denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962); United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966); see also Goren v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 31 
(1941). 
107. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
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specific prior approval by the Agency."10s Snepp's book, Decent 
Interval, concerned the fall of Vietnam. The Government con-
ceded that the book did not divulge classified intelligence, and 
consequently publication was not restrained. Snepp had failed, 
however, to submit his book for pre-publication review, as his 
secrecy agreement required. The Supreme Court agreed with the 
district court that Snepp had both deliberately breached the 
agreement and his position of trust with the CIA and misled 
CIA officials into believing that he would submit the book for 
pre-publication review. The Court reasoned that because the 
Government has "a compelling interest in protecting both the 
secrecy of information important to our national security and 
the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective op-
eration of our foreign intelligence service,"109 it could require all 
information obtained through CIA employment to pass pre-pub-
lication clearance. In the Court's view this "licensing system" 
was needed to filter out material that even risked exposure of 
"classified information and confidential sources."110 
The remedy designed by the Snepp Court was to enjoin 
Snepp from future violations and place all his profits in a con-
structive trust. Yet the Court was less concerned with imposing 
a punishment after the fact than with enforcing a system of 
prior restraint that would "ensure in advance . . . that informa-
tion detrimental to [the] national interest is not published. nm 
By relying on Snepp's secrecy agreement the Court managed to 
circumvent the doctrine against prior restraint entirely; both the 
doctrine and its established exceptions, the majority concluded, 
were simply "inapplicable. "112 
108. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508. 
109. Id. at 509 n.3. This was a consideration that Justice Harlan had alluded to in the 
Pentagon Papers case. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752, 754 
(1971) (per curiam) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
110. 444 U.S. at 512. 
111. Id. at 513 n.8. 
112. Id. at 509 n.3. The Court did suggest that without the agreement, the CIA 
"would have borne the burden of seeking an injunction against publication," id. at 513 
n.8, but unlike the Pentagon Papers Court, the Snepp Court did not discuss the nature 
of that burden. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, characterized 
the CIA secrecy covenant as a prior restraint on free speech. Id. at 526 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that there should be "an especially heavy burden on 
the censor" to justify such a drastic remedy as a constructive trust. Id. The majority's 
suggestion that even unclassified information might be "identified as harmful" did not 
properly set forth this burden. Id. at 522. Citing the Pentagon Papers case and Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), Justice Stevens noted that 
The mere fact that the Agency has the authority to review the test of a critical 
book in search of classified information before it is published is bound to have 
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Thus, the cases of former agents Marchetti and Snepp reveal 
a profound conflict between national security interests and the 
first amendment.113 One may readily agree with the need for se-
crecy in intelligence-gathering activities without necessarily be-
lieving that all publications by former employees discussing in-
telligence operations should be subject to censorship. The 
Fourth Circuit cases suggest that all "classifiable" information, 
however defined, may be withheld from public consideration. 
The Snepp case, in particular, appears to establish that even se-
crecy contracts are unnecessary for the Government to secure an 
injunction; a Government determination of mere probable harm 
may suffice to disapprove publication. Read in that light, Snepp 
reminds one that all liberty hangs by very precious threads; "na-
tional security" is an expandible, not a fixed, concept .. 
B. The Progressive 
I end with United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 114 a case 
that is in some ways a mirror image of the Pentagon Papers de-
cision. The Progressive proposed to publish an article by How-
ard Morland, an investigative reporter, entitled "The H-Bomb 
Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It."1111 Much of the 
significant information in the article was gleaned from Dr. Ed-
ward Teller's Encyclopedia Americana article on the hydrogen 
bomb. 116 While the Government was well aware that a Progres-
an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover, the right to delay publica-
tion until the review is completed is itself a form of prior restraint that would 
not be tolerated in other contexts. 
Id. at 526 n.17. Finally, Justice Stevens's dissent conceded that the "national interest in 
maintaining an effective intelligence service" might justify an exception to the doctrine 
against prior restraint, but stressed that the boundaries of such an exception must be 
carefully defined: 
Id. 
In view of the national interest in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I 
am not prepared to say that the restraint is necessarily intolerable in this con-
text. I am, however, prepared to say that, certiorari having been granted, the 
issue surely should not be resolved in the absence of full briefing and argument. 
113. See generally Kalijarvi and Wallace, Executive Authority to Impose Prior Re-
straint, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 468, 492 (1973) (defining eight substantive fields in which it is 
generally agreed that some measure of secrecy is essential). See also THE FEDERALIST, 
No. 70 (A. Hamilton). 
114. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), appeal dismissed mem., 610 F.2d 819 (7th 
Cir. 1979). 
115. The article was later published under the title: The H-Bomb Secret: To Know 
How ls to Ask Why, THE PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 1978, at 60. 
116. Teller, Hydrogen Bomb, 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 654 (1978). See affidavit of 
Thomas Postel quoted in Note, United States v. Progressive, Inc.: The Faustian Bargain 
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sive editor, Samuel Day, Jr., had visited three government pro-
duction facilities with the consent of the Department of En-
ergy, 117 it nevertheless sought a district court injunction on the 
grounds that the article constituted "Restricted Data" under the 
Atomic Energy Act. 118 . 
The district court119 issued a preliminary injunction entirely 
on the basis of affidavits and in camera documents presented by 
the Government. Noting that first amendment rights are not ab-
solute,120 the court held that the material proposed for publica-
tion fell within Near's national security exception to the doc-
trine against prior restraint: "I want to think a long, hard time 
before I'd give a hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin. It appears to me 
that is what we're doing here.m21 The court concluded that the 
concepts in the article were neither in the public domain122 nor 
declassified, 128 and that "no plausible reason [exists] why the 
public needs to know the technical details about hydrogen bomb 
construction to carry on an informed debate on this issue."124 
The district court went on to distinguish the Pentagon Papers 
case from the one at bar by pointing out that in the former, his-
torical events did not impose a threat of future harm. Unlike the 
Pentagon Papers, the Progressive article threatened "direct, im-
mediate, and irreparable" damage to the country and thus fell 
within the national security exception to the doctrine against 
prior restraint.1211 The court's findings of fact, however, were not 
consistent with its conclusion; the testimony suggested only that 
the article "could possibly" provide information allowing a me-
dium-sized nation to develop a bomb more quickly and "could"-
increase the number of nations with the bomb.126 Using specula-
tive harm to justify prior restraint, I submit, cannot be squared 
and the First Amendment, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 538, 557-58 n.118 (1980). 
117. In addition to these visits by Day, Morland continued to conduct interviews 
with plant officials, as well as photograph weapons on display in the National Atomic 
Museum. Note, A Journalist's View of The Progressive Case: A Look at the Press, Prior 
Restraint, and the First Amendment from the Pentagon Papers to the Future, 42 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1165, 1166-67 (1980). 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (making it a crime to disclose 
restricted data with the intent to harm the United States or "with reason to believe" the 
data will be used to injure the United States or further a foreign nation). 
119. The case was heard in the United States Federal District Court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin. 
120. 467 F. Supp. at 992. 
121. Note, supra note 117, at 1166. 
122. 467 F. Supp. at 993. 
123. Id. at 998. 
124. Id. at 994. 
125. Id. at 994. 
126. Id. at 990, 993, 999. 
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with the Pentagon Papers case. While it is logically consistent 
with the language of the Dennis test - although neither Dennis 
nor the ·balancing language in Nebraska Press were mentioned 
in the Progressive opinion - it has the undesirable consequence 
of permitting publication to be enjoined even when there is only 
a minimal chance that harm will result. Where the cost of a po-
tential disaster is high, as with nuclear war, courts using the 
Progressive test will invariably err on the side of restraining 
publication. 127 
It is difficult even at this stage to judge the wisdom of the 
Progressive's initial decision to publish the article. After Three 
Mile Island and reports of missing uranium, however, it may be 
well for journalists to fight the tendency to use the Atomic En-
ergy Act or its equivalent to stifle policy debate. My view is that 
the court should not have granted an injunction simply on the 
basis of affidavits and documentation. What the Supreme Court 
would do with such a case, or with a restraint against an article 
on recombinant DNA, bacteriological warfare, or any other nas-
cent technology with a potential for abuse, remains to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
I leave you with Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court 
in United States v. Robel, 118 a case upholding the right of a 
Communist to work in a defense plant. Justice Warren wrote: 
Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of 
defending those values and ideas which set this Nation 
apart. For almost two centuries, our country has taken 
singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its 
Constitution, and the most cherished of those ideals 
have found expression in the First Amendment. It would 
indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we 
would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties 
. . . which makes the defense of the Nation worth-
while. ui9 
127. In this particular instance, however, the disputed material was eventually pub-
lished. When another Wisconsin paper printed similar information obtained by a differ-
ent author on September 26, 1979, Press Connection, Sept. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 1, the 
Government dropped its case against the Progressive. Most of the in camera documents 
submitted by the Government were released by stipulation, although some "classified" 
and some "sensitive" material remained under seal. See Note, supra note 17, at 1174. 
128. 389 U.S. 258 (1967). 
129. Id. at 264. 
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In my opinion the press should not be regarded only as a 
check on inefficient or dishonest government. It is important 
that it also be viewed as a powerful vehicle for the effective 
functioning of a government that by definition is democratic in 
nature. The doctrine against prior restraints preserves the "ro-
bust, wide-open" debate that is essential to freedom. 130 I am 
concerned, however, that as Thomas Emerson reminded us in 
1955, "unless the doctrine of prior restraint is given a more ra-
tional and comprehensive form, it is likely to be whittled away 
in future decisions. "131 
Given the cycle of contraction and expansion that has marked 
other doctrines of similar constitutional magnitude, it is point-
less to predict how the Court will decide future prior restraint 
cases. Invariably the tensions between the doctrine against prior 
restraint and its Near exceptions will continue to result in line-
drawing which, as Justice Holmes said in another context, "is so 
far arbitrary that it might equally well have been drawn a little 
further to the one side or to the other."182 Fortunately, the first 
amendment is protected by alert defenders, some of whom have 
powerful voices and deep pockets; there is still good reason to 
hope - and expect - that its values will be carefully preserved. 
130. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 270 (1964). 
131. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 648, 671 
(1955). 
132. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 654 (1873). 
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